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- 'l'h!s paper develops a theory of capital movem
ents in the presence of 
potential expropriation. The threat of 
expropriation is derived from utility 
Potential investors, anticipating
aaximizini behavior by host countries. 
this behavior, modify their investment pla
ns to avoid expropriation. ~'hen­
ever'tbe host country faces c~petitive
 forei~- investors expropriation 
'Tepresents part of a time-consistent b
ut suboptimal plan of the type discuss
ed
• 
The consequent equilibrium may be char
acter­
by Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
. ized by a nuniber of distortions. 
In the simplest model we analyse, a hos
t country faces a large number 
Ye explore the implications of
of potential, competitive foreign invest
ors. 
the threat of expropriation for shadow
 pricing in the host country and for 
lJe consider variants
the optimal technology choice by poten
tial investors. 
of the model in which the potential in
vestor is in a monopoly position vis-a
­
vis the host country, in which the for
eign investment project is subject to 
Tisk which is unresolved st the time o
f the expropriation decision, and in 
which factors affecting the optimality
 of expropriation by the host country 
are unresolved st the til!le of the investm
ent decision. 
The larger the penalty incumbent on th
e host country in the event of 
expropriation, the greater its welfare
 in the simple, competitive model. 
· When the foreign investor is a monop
olist, hwever, this result is reversed
. 
• .• • t 
Introduction
- Ma~y factoTs prevent commodity trade from equalizing the Tt!Vards 
to 
-factors of production in diff
erent countries, providing an
 incentive for 




capital, are important in the w
orld economy, they have not b
een sufficient 
· to equate factor returns amo
ng countries. 
1'he failure of capital flows 
to equate rates of Teturn on 
capital is 
frequently attributed to poli
tical risks and left outside 
the sphere of 
economic analysis. Specifica
lly, investments abroad, espe
cially in LDC's, 
are said to be more subject t
o the Tisk of expropriation, 
or at least to 
unpredictable changes in the 
tax and exchange control Tegi
me offered by the 
host country. Williams (1975
) estimates that about twenty
 percent of t~e 
value of foreign investments 
carried into or made during 1
~56-72 in iDC's 
Rather than consigning 
was expropriated without com
pensation in this period. 
the study of these phenomena 
to other disciplines, we argu
e that an important 
set of economic consideration
s affect the nature of these 
impediments to 
capital mobility. 
In this papeT, we provide a th
eory of expropriation based o
n maxi~izing 
This theory can be used to id
entify 
l,ehavior by investors and hos
t countries. 
industry and national charac
teristics that increase the th
reat cf expropTia-
1 
tion and imply large deviatio
ns from equalized rates cf re
turn on capital. 
Ve examine host country and p
arent country policies minim
izing the distortions 
associated with the threat of
 expropriation. 
First, the threat 
Three bToad conclusions follo
v from the analysis. 
·of expropriation implies sign
ificant distortions in the in
ternational allo­
cation of capital even though
 the.!£.!_ cf eA-propriation may




rare. For instance, in a world of perfect foresight and rational decision­
uking. acts of expropriation would never occur and yet the actions by 
investors taken to ensure that countries do not expropriate are distorting. 
Second, the ability of governments to e~-propriate foreign investments 
may actually reduce their ow velfare. Further, the hosts may be better 
off if investor country governments can retaliate against expropriating 
countries. Indeed, the higher this penalty, the more their welfare may be 
increased. This conclusion arises because a government's power to expro­
priate after investments are made leads investors to restrict their invest­
aents beforehand in a vay that makes the host country worse off than it 
would be if it could not expropriate, yield:1:lg an example of the general 
paradox of time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). 
Third, domestic factor prices may not a:curately reflec~ social returns 
vhen the threat of expropriation affects the supply of foreign investment. 
The social rate of return on capital may-exceed its domestic marginal product 
while the social rate of return on any factor supplied by foreigners and 
1lOt exproprisble may be less than the marginal product of that factor. This 
result has ilnplications for project evaluation in LDC's. 
In Section 2 ve present a simple mo&el of foreign investment with 
potential exprcpriation based on MacDougall 's (1958) work on foreign invest­
aent in the absence of expropriation.·. A small country produces a single 
output vith three factors. Labor is supplied domestically in a fixed amount 
and is not internationally mobile. Two.other factors, capital and management, 
are internationally mobile. These tvo factors differ in that capital can be 
expropriated; management cannot be. For our purposes, capital represents the 
tangible aspects of foreign investment: plant, equipment, inventories and 
other properties left behind after expropriation. M
anagerial services are 
£lie intangible assets that a foreign investor brings 
to the pro~uction 
process:. technical kno~ledge, organizational capabi
lities, access to over-
•· 
Essential to our analysis is the assumption that•eas markets and the like. 
if expropriation occurs, the managerial services of the fore
ign investor are 
llo longer available and cannot be replaced by other f
oreigners. This 
/
situation may arise because foreign managers boycott 
the expropriating 
country or because the capital installed by foreign i
nvestors is specific 
to its own managerial skills. !! post the finn' s managers may have a
 unique 
ability to operate that firm's capital. 
ln deciding on expropriation, a host country must wei
gh the benefits 
of obtaining inco~e from foreign capital and the _o.."'n
ership of the capital 
itself against the costs of losing access to foreign 
managerial services. 
!'or many levels of foreign investment, including the
 one equating the 
domestic marginal product cf capital to the world interest rate, the benefits 
Foreign investors will not increasecf expropriation mav out~eigh the costs. 
their investments to the point where expropriation bec
omes optimal. lf tbe 
threat of expropriation is binding, the level of forei
gn investment and 
national income will be determined by competition amon
g investors and the 
capacity of the host country to absorb foreign invest
ment without expropri­
ation. ln Section 2 we examine the determinants of t
his equilibrium and the 
effects of changes in .national factor endc,,o,,ments and 
world factor prices on 




expropriation on the distri~ution of income emong na
tional factors. 
3 exmnines the associated consequences of the threat of ex
propriation for 
project evaluation and optimal investment decisions in
 host countries. 
-· ·..... 
• ;1.·••••• ,: • 
In Section 4 we consider the case cf a foreign investor who is a mcno­
_polist vis-a-vis a number of potential host countries. The monopolistic 
:investor will always invest less than competitive investors fer a given 
.. technology. National income will also be lower• 
.· Section S examines the consequences cf expropriation fer technical 
choice. We shew that when a parameter of the production function (e.g., the 
elasticity of substitution) is a choice variable for the investors, investors 
... may distort the technology to reduce the threat of expropriation. Because 
of this type of distortion, the threat of expropriation may raise the ~qui­
librium level of investment above the level obtaining under perfect capital 
· •obility. Furthermore, the monopolistic investor may actually invest more 
, than competitive investors, but the host country is still worse off than if 
the foreign it1vest0rs were competitive. 
: 
In Section 6 we return to the assumption that investors are competitive 
lut assume thnt projects are risky and that expropriation transfers this risk 
to the host country. Risk bearing rather than managerial skill is the 
contribution cf foreign investors that cannot be expropriated. A host can 
l>enefit from increases in the riskiness of projects if it is risk averse 
while foreign investors are not, since. risk reduces the threat of expropriation. 
In Section 6 we assume that the risk. inherent in foreign investment is 
: 1lOt resolved until after the expropriation decision must be made. This 
assumption is appropriate to projects where the risk is ongoing. e.g., 
-·-, agricultural projects subject to annual differences in weather or projects 
producing output sold in volatile international markets. For ot~er types of 
projects, uncertainty is resolved before the expropriation decision must be 
ude. This situation may prevail in extractive activity where a mineral 
discovery resolves the uncertainty before production begins. In Section 7 
-s-
ve assume that the national 
end0"1ment of managerial ser
vices is a random 
•ariable revealed after the
 investment decision has be
en made but before 
In this model expropriatio
ns-the hos~ country decides on expropriation. 
Foreign investors.
·can actually occur, in cont
rast with our previous mod
els. 
act knoving of this risk. 
Our model applies specifica
lly to capital movements in
 the form of 
, 
The host country imports not 
only foreign capital but 
direct investment. 
foreign entrepreneurship as
 1o1ell, either in the form o
f managerial services 
or risk bearing. The penalty
 of expropriation is the lo
ss of this entre­
Our model does not incorpo
rate indirect investment si
nce there 
preneurship. 
is no mechanism to insure r
epayment. 
Capital movements in the fo
rm of port~olio investment
 have, however, 
Implicit in this 
become increasingly importa
nt to less developed count
ries. 
form of lending is a set o
f penalties for nonrepaymen
t other ~han the ones 
An important penalty mey b
e exclusion froi:n future pa
rti­
we consider here. 
Elsewhere (Eaton end Gerso
vitz, 
cipation in international c
apital markets. 
1981) we analyze financial m
arket equilibritnn in which 
the penalty of default 
is loss of future ability t
o borrow. 
\le could have incorporated 
similar considerations into
 the current 
analysis. For simplicity, 
however, we focus on a sing
le period of what is 
a repeated process in the relat
i~nship between a host cou
ntey and foreign 
In contrast vith our earlie
r work ve do not consider 
explicitly 
investors. 
the effect 0£ an expropriatio
n on the host country's ab
ility to attract 
. This-exclusion is justified if th
e host 
foreign capital in the future
. 
country has a high discoun
t rate or if it cannot acquir
e a reputation, 
perhaps because its governm
ent changes frequently. A




~corporate the loss of future investment 
•uffered by an expropriation 
into a general penalty consequent upon exp
ropriation, the effects of 1-'hich 
ve do analyze here• 
•. 
Our model does assume, however, that inve
stors act to protect their 
Teputations in punishing expropriation:. a
s a consequence of expropriation 
firms 
, 
withdraw their managerial services or imp
ose other penalties, such as 
• an embargo on future investment in th
e country. An assumption of this sort 
1s essential for the existence of an equil
ibrium with any capital movement 




they have no incentive, ~ post, to impose
 a penalty. 
always expropriate, so that potential investo











A Simple Model of Foreign Investment 
vith Potential Expropriation
2.
- Consider an economy ~reducing a single output (Q) using inputs of 
-:labor (t), capital (K) 1 :id managerial
 services (H) vhere 
(2.1) Q • F(K,H,1) 
·1'1 > 0, 
111 < 
0. The production function F() exh
ibits constant returns 
L,
~o scale. The endo'W!ents cf each fac
tor possessed by the country are: 
~t the time of foreign investment, c
apital and managers arei and fi. 
completely r.obile between countries v
hile workers are entirely immobile. 
by the amounts of foreign
Thus t • L while K and H exceed K and fi 
~nvest~r:it in capital and foreign tra
nsfer of managerial skills respectiv
ely.
-
~e focus only on situations in which K
 > x· and H > H. If l{ < K 
the economy we consider is a capital
 exporter, so that its expropriation
 of 
- . H < -H the host country2 lf K > K whileforeign capital is not an issue. 
bas nothing to lose from expropriatio
n, since it is not importing foreign
 
In this case the host country would 
expropriate any amount of
unagers. 
Investors will then find no amount o
f investment worth­
foreign capital. 
while so that K ~ K. 
The country is small in the internat
ional economy facing a gross r~te 
of return on capital, r, and a mana
gerial reward, s, given by vorld ma
rkets. 
Foreign investors borro~ investment 
funds from the world capital market 
at 
cost (r • 1) and 111Ust repay the princip




Profits of foreign investors if expropriation does
 not occur (TIN) are 
~ (2.2a) nN • f(K,B,L) - y'N - r(K - f) - •CH - B) • 




If expropriation does occur, foreign mana-expropriation does not occur. . - ~· 
gerial services at'e withdralrm, are no longer employ
ed and need not be .pa°id~ 
However, finns
Further, no payments need be made to host country
 factors. 
1DUSt still pay foreign lenders the value of their
 capital plus income. Thus, 
if expropriation occurs, the foreign investors receive
 profits (TIE) of 
E -(2.2b) n • -r(K - K) 
If expropriation occurs, the host country receives natio
nal income (YE) 
of . :.:·_ 
(2.3) yE • f(K,H,L)-- • 
and not othert.Tisee The borderlineExpropriation is optimal if YE > YN 
y'N and K via (2.3)
condition ~•YE defines a relationship betwee
n 
which ve name the EE curve. For a given y'N , investment in e
xcess of the 
K on the EE curve implies expropriation. The sl
op~
corresponding level of 
•
of this curve is 
dYN I •-FK(K,H,L) > 0 •(2.4) 
dK EE 
n given by (2.2a). ~eJn the absence of expropriation profits are 
N 
FR• s and
assume that competition among potential investors
 guarantees 
that ~ is auch that 
(2.5) J?1 • 0 • 
.. 
-
We discuss how the host country migh
t extract -./1 below. Equation (2.5) 
This is the 11 curve
defines a second relationship betwee




7i, • FK(K,H,L) - r 
u~ II 
, 




as the level of K such that 
(2.7) 
K that would obtain under perfect c
apital and managerial
i.e., the level of 
On the ~sual assumption that




> 0, the II curve is upward sloping
 for K < K and do\:T'lward
Fnrlffi - FKH 
sloping for K > K. 
All points belo~
The EE and II curves are illustrated
 in Figure 2.1. 
the EE curve represent situations of
 expropriation. If these curves int
er­
K, the EE c~rve lies every-.--here about the II curvesect only to the left of 
Any investment would be
for K > K and no foreign investment is possi
ble. 
expropriated. If the EE curve inter
sects the I! curve anywhere to the r
ight 
yN since the point
of K, then the country obtains ma~imum income of 
(i, ~) lies above the EE curve. In this 
case the expropriation constraint 
1s not binding. An example of this sit
uation is given by an F() which is
 
since output caunot beIn this case, yE • 0Cobb Douglas and an H• 0. 
produced without H. 
A 
If the EE curve cuts the II curve br
tween K
- and K but not to the 
--
Equilibrium is..
K then the expropriation
 constraint is binding.
right of 
It is possible tba~ the E
E curve 
determined at a point suc
h as Ci, yN). 
and K
.. 
with no intersection-cut• the II curve more than once betveen i 
i. In this case we assume that
 the host obtains the•
·to th~ right of 
At this point the EE cu-rv
e cuts the II curve 
1:dghest possible income. 
Thus, at an equilibrium w










The remainder of this sec
tion focuses on this type
 of equilibrium. 
When the threat of expro
priation is binding, K < 
K as given by (2. 7) 
and the marginal product o
f capital exceeds the vorl
d interest rate, r. 
Thus if all domestic fact
ors are paid their margi
nal products,- foreign 
r, 
tD&nagers are paid their m
arginal product e.nd foreig
n capital is paid 
Euler's theorem illlplies th
at the value of total ou
tput will exceed the sum 
of factor payments by a ve
dge (FK(K,H,L) - r)(K - K) . Ye ass
ume that 
. i .. _hcause of competition 
among potential investors
 this vedge accrues to th
e 
host country. 
there are a number of mec
hanisms whereby the host 
country could extract 
this vedge. One vould be 
the imposition of a lump-su
m tax on foreign 
Such a tax vould all0\,7 th
e host country to 
investors in this amount.
 
uximize the benefits from
 foreign invest~ent given




lent tax vould be a tax o




at the point where the
 Et and 11·curves inter
sect. 
" .. -(1 - tK)FK(K,H,L) • r 
'faxes on foreign capita
l in tDC'a are 1n fact
 quite common and can 
be 
justified if foreign in
vestment is already co






ption that the host co
untry does receive the
 rent 
on foreign investfflent,
 we no~ analyse the ef
fects of changes in va
rious 
exogenous variables on
 the equilibrium level
 of investment and on 
national 
income when the threat
 of expropriation is b
inding. 
First consider an incr
ease in K, the supply of nation
ally-owned 
r, raising the 
This change shifts the 
II curve up by an amou
nt
capital. 
If the threat of expro
priation vere
yN a..~d K.
·equilibrium levels of .. Y
..N would rise by r. lr1h
en the
K while
11ot bindingr K vould
 remain at 
K, however, en increa
se in national 
threat of expropriation
 determines 
end Taises national in
come by 
· capital raises the to
tal level of 
111ore than r • 
s and the EE curve up
 
l,:n increase in H shifts th
e II curve up by 
s and may even 
by FH(K 1 H,L) > s. Equilibrium
· income rises by less t
han 
~1th more national ma
nagers 
The level of foreign i
nvestcent falls.
fall. 
This•effect leads to 
a 
expropriation is, cete
ris paribus, more desi
rable. 
reduction in foreign i
nvestment and in the t
otal capital stock. 
FL(K,H,L) and the EE 
An increase in i shifts the 
II curve up by 
Since at equilibrium 
H> H, income rises by more 






t rises or falls as 
or less than FL(K,ft,L
) 
L increases the benefit 
tf labor and managers are
 complements an increa
se 1n 
accruing to the host fro
m the presence of for




has no effect on the E
t cune but shifts the 
II curve 
, . •. 
· An increase in T ... 
----------------
-12-
do,m by (K - K) • The equilibrium level of K falls, as does the equilibrium 
level of "1 which falls by more than K - K, the amount by which ~ falls. 
• bas no effect on the EE curve (at the equilibrium- An increase in 
•
·point) _but shifts the II curve down by H - H. Again the equilibrium level 
of K falls, as does the equilibrium level of ~, which falls by more 
than' H - H, the amount by which .yN falls. 
When the threat of expropriation is binding, increases in the inter-
. national prices of imported factors have a larger negative effect on national 
income than otherwise. The reason is that, at higher prices of these factors, 
only a lower level of compensation of national factors is compatible with 
competitive ~quilibrium. At a given level of foreign investment, expro­
priation would be optimal. Renee foreign investment is reduced. 
If a penalty (P > 0) is imposed in case of expropriation equation (2.3) 
can be modified to
.. 
(2.3') • 
•• I • .. 
J.n increase in P leaves the II curve unchanged but shifts the EE curve 
down, increasing foreign investment and national income. Thus a penalty 
• for expropriation can make a capital importer better off. 
Finally we note the distributional consequences of the thTeat of expro­
priation. For analytic simplicity we assume that the tax implicit in a 
binding thr£at of expropriation accrues to the government while the three 
national factors earn their marginal products. In relation to a situation
.
of perfect capital mobility, capital gains (by (FK(K,H,L) - r)K) vhile 
~·= · labor loses. National ·managers earn & independent of the level of foreign 
investment and are unaffected. In Section 7, where we present a model where 
the act of expropriation can actually occur, we discuss the effects of an 
expropriation itself on the distribution of income among factors. 
-13-
Implications for Project Evaluation
 
K ,-L and fi, ·were
- ln the previous section, national factor s
upplies 
exogenous. From a longer-run persp
ective, hovever, the supplies of c
apital 
-­.
and managerial services are determ
ined by national decisions to inve
st in 
In this section ve use the model to
 examine
physical and human capital. 
the implications of expropriation for
 optimal investment strategies. 
The model implicitly determines na
tional income, Y, in terms of the 
Consider
national endo~ents of factors so 
that we may vrite Y • Y(K,H,L) • 
In the first period resources are 
allocated to~ard
a two-period decision. 
The economy initially has a work
producing physical and human capita
l. 
N and training for management requi
res vithdrawal from· he
force of size 
· labor force for one period, denoted 
period O. Consumption in the f rs
t 
peric~ is therefore 
(3.1) 
O production function for c0tmnod
itiLs. Preferences
where I is the period 
are a function of period O consu
mption and period l natio~al incom
e, U(C0 ,Y). 
will be chosen so thatThen ii and i 
(3.2) 
(3.3) -U l' +UY-• 0 •l 2 H 
At an expropriation-constrained equilibr
ium described by (2.8) and the 
EE and II curves 
dY
Y-: - -K - dK 
--
(3.S) 
Consider first the social return to national capital, Yi. - From (2.8a), 
~at an equilibrium,the coefficient of FK(K,B,L) - r is positive. Thus, 
. .. -
since FK(K,H,L) - r > 0, the social return to national capital exceeds 
the world interest rate r. Furthermore, if managers and capital are 
/ 
Yi> FK(K,R,L) ; i.e.,complements, FK(K,H,L) < FK(K,B,L) • In this case 
the social return to national capital exceeds its marginal physical product. 
· Conversely, if K and B are substitutes, FK(K,H,L) > FK(K,H,L) and the 
·return to capital lies between the domestic marginal physical product' and 
the world interest rate. In the first case increasing the capital stock 
.1ncreases th~ productivity of managers, thereby reducing the incentive to 
expropriate. Conversely in the second case. 
An increase in the supply of national managerial services, on the other 
hand, increases income by less than th~ world reward to managerial services, 
•, which equals the domestic marginal product of managerial services. By 
reducing reliance on foreign managerial services, an increase in fi reduces 
the availability of foreign capital. This effect may operate to the extent 
_that Yii < 0. • 
In smim.ary, when the threat of expropriation is binding it is optitnal 
~o deviat~ from both marginal product and world price rules in investment 
decisions. As long•~ capital and managers are complements both rules tend 
to understate the marginal social product of capital and to overstate the 
urginal social p~oduct of managers. 
~ .....• .. ,. 
,... 
-
4. Investment by Monopolistic InvestoTs 
In Section 2 we assumed that investors 
vere perfectly comp~titive in 
that the host country could extract a p
ayment that drove profits to zero.
-.
Facing.a large number of potential inve
stors, the host would only accept 
~e now turn to
· investment projects yielding zero pr
ofits to the investor. 
. the ,;ase in which the foreign investo
r is a monopolist vis-a-vis a large 
Dumber of host countries, but remains c
ompetitive in world markets for 
The threat of expropriation neverthele
ss
capital and managerial services.
7 
exists. 
As before, if the host country expropr
iates, it earns an income of 
E - -,Y • F(K,H,L.• The monopolistic investor
 must pay the host country at 
least this &1ount to preclude expropriat
ion, but has no reason to pay more. 
Thus profits are given by 
nN • F(K,H,L) - F(K,H,L) - r(K - K) - s(H - H) • 




... -.. . .... · .... 
.. -
FKK(K,H,L) -
For the second-order condition to be sa
tisfied we require that 
F,x(K,H,L) < 0, i.e., FKKH < 0. If i
t is not satisfied anywhere, then 
As in the competitive case, the
X• K and uo foreign investment occurs. 
forei~ investor equates the :n.arginal pro
duct of managerial services to the 
world salary but maintains a domestic pr
oduct of capital in excess of the 
world inter!st rate. 
Subsituting (4.2) and (4.3) into (4.1) 




as an alternative expression for profits. Monopoly profits are the differ­
ence between national factor incomes at actual marginal productivities and 
the marginal productivities that would obtain if expropriation were to occur. 
Consider again a penalty P that the host country would suffer if it 
should expropriate. In this case the host country will receive only 
-_ :· r . F(K,ii,i:> - p 
in the event of expropriation. Note that the same K is chosen by the 
1n0nopolist since P does not alter the first order conditions (4.2) and 
(4.3). However, the investor need only pay the amount r' to preclude 
expropriation. The existence of the penalty increases monopoly profits and 
reduces national income even though expropriation does not take place, in 
contrast with the competitive case, where the penalty raises national income. 
Civen the production function F() , the monopolist will always invest 
less than competitive investors. lJhen (4.2) is satisfied, (4.1) is positive. 
Since· t1ic ~ 0 for values of K greater than the level of monopoly invest­
-sent, the level of K which satisfies n • 0 is greater than the level 
.-: ~bat satisfies nK • 0 • 
- , . 
1. \ . 
•; 1. 
. ·-'':"11 __; .: ...... •·; .... 
.· :•.·,,, 
.....i ......... •• ·, ·, 
I .: 
,~ y ·. ,, . .' .'· .'\ ,.. 
- -
5. ,?otential Expropriation and the Distor
tion o~ Technology 
tn Section 2 the threat of expropriation was
 show to imply a distortion 
Too little capital was invested by fore
igners so that the
1n factor use. 
economy's capital-labor ratio (K/L) wa
s below the unconstrained optimum. 
-Other forms of distortion may be conse
quences of a thre.at of expropriation. 
For instance, Magee (1977) discusses exp
enditures foreign investors may make 




very general formulation of this notion
 is to assume that the fim's 
profit in the absence of expropriation 
is given by 
- - .. .. 
N
N • F(K,H,L,y) - s(H-H} - r(K-K) - C(K,H,L
,y) - Y
(S.l) n 
where y is a parameter of the productio
n function and C(•) is the cost over 
and above any effect on F() of choosi
ng a particular value of y. Increases
 
In the event of expropriation, nationa
l
in y increase C, i.e., oC/oy > 0. 
~ncome is 
• J(K,H,L,y)(5.2) yE --
vhere J(•) is the country's production 
function after expropria~ion.
8 
Once the possibility of distorting tech
nology is introduced, two 
Fi,:-st,
conclusions from the previous analysis
 need not obtnin. 
tbe level of investment occurring in 
competitive equilibrium under a 
under perfectobtaining
threat of expropriation may exceed tha
t 
capital mobility. Second, a monopolis
tic investor may invest~ than 
.. ..
tbe competitive equilibrium level of capi
tal. 
.to establish these propositions ve define 
(S.3) C(K,y) =F(K,H,L,y) - C{K,H,L,y) - s{H- H) 
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where, since His mobile_!! post, His defined implicitly by FH - ~ - a• 0. 
For ■ implicity we consider a technology in which y assumes a value of either 
G...cr 1, and assume that G(K,0) > G(K,1) for all K. 
Jn the absence of an expropriation option, competitive investors will 
choose y • 0 and set K • i , where GK(i0 , 0) • r. If however,0 
where we suppress the constants Hand Lin J( ), investment at a level i 0 
would lead to expropriation. If y • 0 investment would occur only until 
* ,. * JC• K where K0 satisfies (5.,) with equality • 0 < K0 .. 
Consider now the case where y • 1. Define x1 as the level of K satis-
fying GK (K1 , l) • r. If 
... .. •(5.5) J(Kl • 1) < G(R. t 1) - r<11 - i> > J(KO • 0)1 
... 
then, by choosing y •land investing K1, competitive investors can provide 
the host country a higher national income than by choosing y • 0 and invest­
ing K~. If, instead, the first inequality of (5.5) is not satisfied, in-
* * .vestors will provide only~ capital if y • 1, where K1 satisfies 
.·.. ·•. 
* ... * -(5.6) J(1½_, 1) • G(11, 1) - r(Ki - K) • 
5evertheless, if 
(S.7) 1) > J(K* 0 , 0) 
.. 
competitive investors can still provide the host country a higher income by 
choosing y •land rationing investment at Xi.* Nothing precludes the p~ssi-
.. • * ..
bility that K1 > K0 or that K1 > K • 
In these cases~ capital is installed
0 
because the threat of expropriation is binding when the first best (y • 0) is 
used. This possibility requires, however, that 
(5.8) 
i.e., that the distortion of technology a
ugment the 1narginal product of 
capital ro the investor.-
To establish the second proposition ass
ume that, in fact, J(K~, 0) > 
JUS:,• l). In this case, under competition, there ~~11 be no distortion of 
If, instead, there is a single 1nonopo
listic
technology and y -will equal 0., 
investor his profits will be 
(G(Km, y) - J(tf', y) - r(tD - K)](5.9) ,nax y y y
y-0,1 
vhere ~ is defined implicitly by the cond
ition: 
y • 0,1.(5.10) 
If J(K, 0) >> J (K, 1), then (5. 9) is like
ly to be attained at y • 1. If, 
in addition, ~K(K,l) < JK(K,0), then 
The monopolist 1t.ay find that, by disto
rting his 
technology in a way that increases the 
marginal product of capital to him, 
be reduces the usefulness of his capita
l stock to a potential expropriator, 
Because the
thereby reducing required compensation 
to the host country. 
urginal product of capital is greater
 witl1 this distortion, he invests 
1110re than competitive investors who, in
 this case, do not install a distorted
 
technology. 
the· distortion of technology, in terms of
 its effects on the welfare of 
the host country, is analogous to an in
crease in the penalty P incumbent on 
tinlen potential investors are competiti
ve,
the host in the event of default. 
the host country benefits from the abi
lity of investors to distort technolo~
y. 
The abillty of a monopolistic investor
 to distort technology, however, acts 




6. pPtimal lnvestment in Risky Projects 
In Sections 2 to 5 foreign investment was riskless. heque
ntly, however, 
In-foreign investors engage in risky activities bearing much of this risk. 
~
·exprop~iating such activities the host assumes th
e risk inherent in these 
activities. 
-We assume that domestic production (Q) is given b
y the f~ction 
• (6.1) Q • 8F(K,L) , 
e is a random variable; in this section we abstract from managerial
 services. 
K and L. Capital is mobile~ational endo\mlents of capital and labor are 
Capital
across borders before the investment takes place "7
hile labor is not. 
El is know and cE.nnot be withdraw. Expropriati
on
is in place at the time 
e is know. Investors are CO!'ll­'ll'USt also be chosen before the true value of 
petitive and either risk neutral or consider the ri
sk compietely diversifiable. 
ln the absence of expropriation, host income is 
yN regardless of e. 
If expropristion occurs, national income (YE) dep
ends on El : 
(6.2) 
U(yN) and not other­
Expropriation will be optimal if .E[U(YE)] exceed
s 
is the host's utility of income. Since E[U(YE)l
 increases
vise were U{•) 
· 1n It , the condition 
.......,. . _... ,,. 
· (6.3) 
. 
such that K > K* i~plies
implicitly defines a level of K, denoted x*r!> 
Note that K*'(YN) > 0.
that expropriation is optimal and not otherwise. 
lf expropriation occurs foreign investors will earn prof
its of 
! -(6.4) n • -r(K - K) 
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assuming, as before, that foreign sources of capital m
ust be paid regardless. 






• er(K,L) - r(K - K) - r· •
-·.
- -






by the level of K satisfying (6.6). 
Competition among investors and taxation of the type 
discussed in 
Section 2 will raise ,,iN to the point where 
(6.7) E[SF(K,L) - ,,iN - r(K - K)] • 0 • 
J)enote the level of ~ satisfying (~.7) at K • Y. by yN. If 
•N 
K < K~(YN) 
• Y_ an equilibrium
then K defines an equilibrium level cf total investm
ent and 
level of national income. At this equilibrium the threa
t of expropriation is
.. 
not binding. If however i > K*(yN) investment at a level of K will lead to 
expropriation and the equilibri\JI!I level of·~vestment 
will be constrained. 
K and Y
We depict the resulting equilibrium in Figure 6.1. V
alues of 
. N 
consistent with competition in international capital 
markets, i.e., satisfy­
Values satisfying the no. ing (6.7), are illustrated by the curve II. 
expropriation condition vi.th strict equality, i.e., 
· • · · (6.S) E{U[SF(K,L)]) - U(yN) 
are illustrated by the curve EE. 
the slope cf II is given by 
(6.9) d~ I •E(erK - r )
dK II 
. ·-·· .... •' 
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.. .. Thus the II cut"Ve achieves
positive for K < K and negative for K > K
. 







dK EE tJ' (~) 
. - .. 
The expected output if no investment occurs is, 
• 
(6.11) ~ =E(G)F(K.L) • 
This is the amount foxeign investors are wi11i
ng to pay to produce in the 
? by the
_host country without investing any foreign ca
pital. Ye define 
relationship 
(6.12) 
i.e., ~ is the amount investors must pay the host for th
e right to use 
· domestic factors if they make no investment 
themselves. 
~ < YN • · In this ~ase the EE and II curves·... If U is concave then 
K, i.e.. there will exist one equilibriUlil c0t:1-will cross to the right of 
patible with: (l) competitive international c
apital markets, (2) no expro­
priation a~d (3) a positive level of foreign i
nvestment. Thus if the host 
is risk averse while investors are risk neutr
al, some investment will occur •
..
K the equilibrium will beIf the tt and II cut"Ves cross to the right of 
and the threat of expropriation is not bindin
g•
characterized by i and f ..
K the competitive equilibrium levelsJf the curves cross only to the left of 
Y are constrained by the threat of expropri
ation. If the EE
of E and-. 
curve cuts the II curve more than once, ve ass
ume, as before, that the equi­
obtains. Ye next determine the effects oflibrium with the highest -./1 
r on the equilibrium levels of
increases in risk and in E(e) , K, L and 
vhen the tt curve cuts the 11 cut"Ve from below 
and the threat of
~ and Y 
expropriation is binding (K < K) • 
First, if output beeomes more uncerta±n, ~ risk merse host country is 
less willing to expropriate. A lower level =I comper.sr'tio~ ~ is required 
to forestall expropriation of a given capital stock. The EE curve shifts 
clown. Risk neutral investors do not requiN a highe:r expected return, so 
the II curve does not shift. The equilibrium values &if ~ and K rise. 
- Paradoxically, then, an increase in the riskiness of ~nvestment can actually 
increase national income and national velfare by redutlng the incentive to 
expropriate and attracting foreign investment. 
Given K, an increase in E(8) shifts both the l:E and II curves up by an 
amount F. Income, but uot the level of foreign im.,estment, rises. 
An increase in L shifts the II curve up by an mnount 
(6.13) ~ f • E(e)F 
dJ.. III L 
and the !E cur.re by 
If the host country is risk averse U' is a decreasing function of e and 
the second term in the far right version of (6.14) is negative. Hence the 
JI curve shifts up hy more than the 'EE curve. yN r.wes by more than E(0)FL 
and foreign investment rises. Because an increase .tn L raises the riskiness 
aa well as the level of output the host country is ah:l.e to accept more capital. 
An increase in i or a reduction in T conti:Ilm!.s to increase income. 
As in the certainty 1nodc?l, this effect is :buger \ffiZ!Il 'the threat of expro­
priation _is binding relative to a sim.atim, aif perfm:'ll: capital mobility. 
, . ' 
J 
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Investment vi.th Stochastic Expropriation 
In previous sections we have presented models in which expropriation 
Dever actually occurs. In a deterministic context, or in a context in which 
the expropriation decision must occur before any randomness is resolved, ex-
- propriation can be predicted exactly, and rational, fully-informed investors 
will not make investments that will be expropriated. If, however, some 
/ . . . 
random process affecting the desirability of expropriation is resolved bet~een 
the time of the investment-and the expropriation decision, investments may be 
expropriated. Investors make such investments accepting this risk. 
Although the investigation of a model with stochastic expropriation is 
considerably more difficult than the preceding analysis it is crucially 
important to an understanding of the expropriation issue. To illustrate this 
phenomenon, (;onsider again the model developed in section 2, but assume that 
the supply of national managers, H , is given by a function · ii(e) increasing 
.• in e , vherf! e is a random variable uniformly distributed on (0,1). e is 
Dot known when investment takes place but is revealed before the expropriation 
decision. A number of other variables could be random. Introducing \lllcertain­
ty in the supply of national managers provides one simple means of illustrating 
some aspects of stochastic expropriation. 
lationa: income, if expropriation does not take place, is given by 
. -
(7.1) s(H - H) 
dwhere r is the interest rate paid national capital, v the wage and other · 
•ariables are defined in section 2. The third part of equation (7.1) follows 
from Euler's theorem and our assumption that national factors receive their 
urginal products. In contrast to the deterministic case, such payments v.111 
exhaust product, as we show below. The profits of foreign firms, if 
-2s-
expropriation does not occur, are, as before,
 
N ,.. _ __N - ... -
(7.2) n • F(K,H,L) - Y- - r(K - K) - s(H - R) • 
•..
-
In the event of expropriation, ho-wever, natio
nal income becomes 
(7.3) 
vhere 
(7.4) G(K,B(0),H,L) =max[F{K,H(e),L), F(K,H,L) + s(H - H)] 
fi(e) > H for high values of e. This possi­since it is now possible that 
bility of the host exporting managerial serv
ices was ruled out in the deter­
Profits are silllply, as before,·mnistic model of section 2. 
E -(7.S) n • -r(K - K) • 
YE>~ and not othen.~se.Expropriation becomes optimal, then, wen 
~ote that both YE and ~ ~re increA~ing in e, and th
at 
d~
(7.6) - .. sii'de 
-
dYE
(7. 7) d0 
-= · {max[FH(K,H(0) ,L) ,s] Hi• 
•o that 
i.e., as e rises, e?tJ)ropriation becomes more desirable. 
. . *
the value e is defined by the condition 
.
(7.8) ,Nee*> • yEce*> 
OT e• • 0 if yE(O) > ~(O) or 
e* • l if yN(l) > YE(l) • 
Expected profits are given by 
- (7.9) 
- . - .....- -- - . 
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\le assume that investoTs are •tomistic, and take not only rands, 
,ut T,d wand e* as given; individual investors invest too little to consider 
their investments to affect national factor prices or the p~obability of ex
pro-
-l)l'iation. Competition among investors implies zero expected profits 
(7.10a) E(TI) • 0 • 
This ~ondition, along with the assumption that national factors and fore
ign 
.... unagers are paid their marginal products and Euler's theorem, implies that 
(7.10b) (if JC> 0). 
But this result is equivalent to the first order condition of E(n) with
 
~espect to K. In a situation of stochastic expropriation, the host need not 
zero expected profits - the probability of ex­-impose a tax c.,f tK* to ensure 
propriation, a - e*), plays an analogous role. 
Togeth~r (7.8) and (7.10a), along with r, s, Kand L, determine equi­
librium value3 of JC, Band e*. 
Using FH • s to detennine H implicitly and substituting into (7.8) an
d 
(7.10b) we obtain two equations in two unknowns, e* and K. Relationship (7 .lOb) 
gives values of Kand e* consistent with zero profits. lJe denote this locus 
Che 11 curve. If e* c (0,1) the II cUTVe has slope. 
(7.11) • 
If Fis a well-behaved production function, the principal minors alternate
 
in sign and FlCKFBH > F~, implying that the 11 curve slopes upward. An in-
crease in~* increases the expected return on capital, incTeasing K. The 11 
cUTVe is drawn in fi~ure 7.1. Ate*• 0 expropriation is almost certain 
and K • K; no foreign investment takes place. At the other extreme, if 
e• • 1 expropriation is almost certain not to occur, and K • K, where 
-27-
defines the equilibrium value of K. 




'Variables. We call it the EE curve. It has slope 
2 -
. -
FmfK + (THHFKK - FHK) (K- K)de*(7.12) dK IEE F (s-C )H'.,. .. , HH H
! . - ...... , ~· .·, 
-vhich is ambiguous in sign. The ambiguity arises because an increase 
m K raises income wether expropriation occurs or not. 
In general we cannot say in which state income rises more. 
Because of this ambiguity-equilibria with higher levels of foreign investment 
IDSY, ceteris naribus, be associated with a lower probability of expropriation. 
Whatever the slope of the EE curve, however, it lies completely to the 
· right of K for e* < 1; at K -= K, YN ~ YE for all values of ~- · If K -= K, the 
host country gains no capital by expropriating
, 
but loses its ability to 
import managerial services. Consequently the threat of expropriation never 
prohibits foreign investment entirely. 
The EE and II curves may cross several times as illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
Because e* tends to zero as K tends to infinity, the last intersection of 
these two curves must have the EE curve cutting the II curve from above. 
'The expected value of the host's income, E[Y(0)], is given by 
(7.13) 
Using (7.1), (7.8), (7.1Ob) and (7.11), it can be shown that 
* 2 -
dECY) I c [ e crKH - FKKFffil)(K - K)
(7.14) de* II FBH 
i.e., E(Y) increases along the II curve. We assume, as before, that the 
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host country ensures that the highest intersection of the EE and the II 
curves is chosen. 
- the local effects of increases in K, L, E(H), r and • -are deter-
1Dined by the effect of these changes on the positions of the II and EE curves: 
First consider an increase in K. The II curve is unaffected while the 
EE curve shifts up. The equilibrium levels of e* and K rise; i.e., total 
investment rises and the probability of default declines. As in the preceding 
models, national capital does not crowd out foreign capital one-for-one. 
Secondly, if L increases the II curve shifts dotim (which·follows from 
Euler's theorem applied to the marginal products of a constant return to 
scale production function) while the direction of the shift in the EE curve 
is ambiguous. Consequently e
tc 
and K may rise or fall. 
-Thirdly, if the distribution of e changes to dominate the original in 
the first-order sense, i.e., if larger numbers of domestic managers becone 
more probable, the II curve is unaffected while the EE curve shifts do"1n. 
Foreign investment falls and the probability of expropriation, 1 - e*, rises. 
Fourth, an increase in r, the world interest rate, shifts the II curve 
upward while the EE curve is unaffected. The level of investment falls while 
the probability of expropriation also falls if the EE curve slopes up but 
···rises· if it slopes dotim. 
If s rises the EE curve shifts dovn while the shift in the II curve 
* .
fa ambiguous. The effects on e and K are therefore indeterminate. 
P imposed by the investor'sIntroducing an exogenous penalty in amount 
country on an expropriating host does not affect the II curve while the EE 
curve becomes 
(7.8') 
.; : ..... 
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An increase in the penalty shifts the EE curve 
upward so that the level of
•• 
investment, K, rises while the probability o
f expropriation, e • falls. 
As long as capital and managers are compleme
ntary factors the penalty 
Taises the income of the host country in any 
state of nature, even in states 
First, in
vhere expropriation actually occurs and the p
enalty is i?llposed. 
any state in which extiropriation does not occ
ur, host country income rises, 
as may/be shoi.m by differentiating the third part
 of (7.1) with respect to 
In state e* host country income is the same whe
ther or not expropriation
JC. 
Since ~(El*) rises. so must YE(e*). Thus. occurs. 
dYNce•) dYE(e*) - ·* - dK • 
•.. 
(7.15) - - GK(K,H(0 ),L) dP - 1 > 0 dP dP 
- . * - dK for all e > ~•.
As long as GKH > 0 t if GK(K,H(El ) ,L) > 1 th
en GK dP > l 
Thus, even in states where the penalty 1! iDl?osed, the exis
tence of the 
penalty raises inc0tne: the positive, indirec
t effect of the penalty in rais­
ing the level of the capital stock dominat
es:thc direct, negative effect 
9
of the penalty. 
In section 2 we discussed the implications of
 2 binding threat of 
~e now consider the distributionalexpropriation on income distribution. 
10 Of course the effect of expropriationimplications of expropriation itself. 
on income distribution depends upon how the i
ncome from the expropriated 
capital is distributed among factors. If expr
opriation raises national 
income as a whole this .income can be distriou
ted in a way which hanns no 
domestic factor. For analytic convenience, h
owever, we will assume that 
income acct"Ues to a fourth party, perhaps the
 government. 
First. note that if H(0) > Hwhen expropriation occurs only Hmana~ers 
will be employed domestically. In this case e
xpropriation does not affect 
the d0t11estic levels of factor use. Hence, for
 this case, the act of expro­
priation has no distributional effects since
 marginal products are unaffected. 
' ·.. - ., . . 
_,.. l It 
Jf, however, H(0) < H, only H(0) managers will be available domestically 
Managers will gain, since they earn F8 CK,H(0
),L) > s •
after an expropriation. 
Labor gains or loses as FLH ~ 0 while capital gains or loses as78 (K,R,L). 
FJCH <> O; that is, factors complementary with managerial services lose
 while 
Both capital and labor may lose fr01I1 an expropriation butaubstitutes gain. 
j , 
both cannot gain. 
to summarize, an increase in the probability of expropriation, i
f expro­
priation does not occur, tends to benefit national capita
l, harm labor and 
leave national managers unaffected relative to a situation 
of perfect capital 
aobility. If all factors are comple1nents expropriation i
tself will either 
leave all factors unaffected relative to a situation of no 
expropriation, or 
harm capital and labor and benefit managers. 
Throughout, we have related the expropriation decision. to'
 its effect 
on national income or on the expected ·utility of national 
income. Authorities 
controlling the expropriation decision may be motivated m
ore by the effects 
of expropriation on various sub-groups rather than on the ec
onomy as a whole. 
~µension of our analysis would be a reformulation of the 
expropriationk 
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8. Conclusion 
It is widely recognized that the threat of expropri
ation can create 
This threat bas usuafly, however,departures from perfect capital mobility. 
·been treated as an exogenous factor not susceptib
le of economic analysis. 
In this paper we have developed a model of expropri
ation derived explicitly 
from utility maximizing behavior on the part of 
host countries and investors. 
\'bile our basic model is a simple one, in the tra
dition of neoclassical trade 
.. theory, it yields a number of implications abou
t the effects of expropriation 
on the welfare of the host country, on the distri
bution of income in the host 
country, on the appropriate shadow pricing of fa
ctors of production, and on 
the choice of technology in production. lJhile w
e have explored a number of 
variants of our model, for instance by introduci
ng uncertainty of two qufte 
The threat of expropriati•Jn isdifferent forms, several basic points emerge. 
\ 
detri~~nt~l to the ~elfare of a host country facing
 competitive foreign 
investors; domestic capitalists benefit from the
 threat of expropriation while 
Domestic managers are unaffected. If thethe effect on labor is detrimental. 
threat of expropriation constrains the level of f
oreign investment, domestic 
urtinal productivities understate the marginal 
social product of capital, if 
capital and managers are complementary, and over
state the marginal soci~l 
product of managers. 
The extent to wich a host country is subject to
 a penalty if it should 
expropriate actually enhances the welfare of a ho
st country facing comp~titive 
potential foreign investors when there is no uncer
tainty about expropriation. 
this conclusion is reversed if a foreign investo
r is in a monopoly position 
If investors are competitive but it is uncertain'Vis-a-vis the host country. 
the investment is
whether or not expropriation will occur at the tim
e 
As long as
aade, the effect of an expropriation penalty1118y 
be ambiguous. 
. . 
aanagers and capital are complements, however, the penalty raise
s host-
country income in all etates of nature, even those states in whi
ch expro-
priation occurs and the penalty is imposed.-
Our theory has a ntm1ber of implications for empirical research. Fi
rst, 
it provides a framework for predicting were deviations from perfe
ct capital 
•obility are most likely to emerge and suggests a ntm1ber of test
able hypo-
, 
For example, countries with high endowments of managerial skillstheses. 
relative to physical capital are most likely to remain with a high 
marginal 
physical product of capital. Secondly, the stochastic model we 
develop in 
Section 7 provides a structure for estimating expropriation prob
abilities in 
. 
Thirdly, our model suggests a number of characteristicsdifferent countries. 
of technology and factor employment which might be observed as a co
nsequence 
For instance, our model suggests explanationsof a threat of expropriation. 
.. for observed differences in technologies used by foreign and domest
ic fi!"Il'ls 
in the same country. 
The approach in this paper could be extended to situations of cree
ping 
expropriation through the increasing taxation over time of indiv
idual foreign 
investments (Hirschman, 1969). For instance, if the host country 
workers and 
111anagers experienced learning-by-doing ~ile in contact with for
eign managers, 
Consider­
the vulnerability of a foreign investment might increase over time
. 
ation of this type of proble1n provides one avenue for further theore
tical 
-Tesearch. 
:._ •• 1. 
-.- . . . .., .. 
: : ··, . . ...- . ...... ' 
.. . .. ,..,,, ..... 
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»OTES 
1-. For instance, ~illiams {1975) a
nd Jodice {1980) report evidence s
uggesting 
~ that expropriation is particul
arly frequent in the banking secto
r and 
that manufacturing investments are
 less vulnerable than mining inves
tments. 
2. 'We assume that in the event of ex
propriation any asset abroad of th
e host 
The benefits of expropriation thus
country will be seized in retaliat
ion. 
depend only upon the~ capital po
sition. 
3. Contrasting the equilibrium were
 the expropriation threat is bindi
~g 
v:ltb the unconstrained equilibrium
, note that the capital-labor rati
o is 
lower in the first situation while 
the relative magnitude of H/L is 
higher if capital and management are 
substitutes but lower if they are 
Thus, given a productic~ f~!:ti~n,
 the threat of expropriation
complements. 
distorts factor hiring decisions. 
In Section S we discuss how the th
reat 
of expropriation may cause firms to m
odify the production function itse
lf. 
Forsyth and Solomon {1977) summar
ize the evidence on ~ifferences in
 factor 
There appears to be no overall
proportions by nationality of inve
stor. 
tendency for foreign investors to 
employ different factor proportion
s than 
domestic investors. Wide disparit
ies in either direction exist, ho
~ever, 
It would be of interest to knoY if
 those industries
1n specific industries. 
· where the risk of ~xpropriation is 
ceteris paribus greater exhibit re
la­
tively labor intensive production by 
foreign finns. 
4. Rote that the left-hand side of (
2.8a) is the marginal product of 
capital 
holding the emplo)'t:lent of mana~ers
 constant at the national endo"1tne
nt 
The first term on the right-hand s
ide is the marginal product
level, H. 
of capital holding the employment 
of manasers at the optimal level w
en 
.. -·-· ---·- ---.-
A A 
managers are internationally mobile, B. Since we assume B > H • the 
<
first marginal product is greater or less than the second as FICH > 0. 
5. If we had made the alternative assumption that the wedge (FK - r)(K - K) 
accrued to investors rather than to the host country, our results would 
1>e parallel but not identical. The EE curve would remain the same while 
the relationship 
would define national income and replace the II curve. Denoting this 
equation the II' curve, note that it lies below the II curve. Thus if 
foreign investors receive the rent associated with the threat of expro­
priation, the equilibrium level of investment and national income will be 
lower than in the case we consider. If this line of thought is to be 
pursued, a theory is needed to explain hew the right to invest is rationed 
among competing potential foreign investors. We find it more realistic, 
however, to assume that host co\ll'ltries are able to exploit their position 
vis-a-vis competitive investors and capture the rents associated with 
foreign investment. Note that a tax on foreign investment income at rate 
tK* _maximizes not only national income but the level of foreign investment 
as well. In the range between O and tK* an increase in the tax rate 
on foreign capital income tK actually summons ~ foreign capital: as 
tK rises in t.his range so do the benefits to the host country of not 
expropriating. Thus foreign investors can invest more without suffering 
expropriation. 
6. Taxation of foreign capital often takes the form of a requirement that 
a national of the host country receive a share in the equity of a foreign 
investment without providing a commensurate share of funds. The host 
-
-
country 1nay not necessarily obtai
n this transfer via legal 111eans.
 It 
Foreign
could·also be effected via bribes
, a form of illegal taxation. 
'
investors do, apparently, frequen
tly pay bribes to host country o
fficials 
for th~ right to invest. 
7. An alternative assumption is that 
one investor faces one host lead
ing to 
a Cournot-Nash or similar game theor
etic analysis, a topic vhich we 
leave 
~o possible future analysis. 
F() might be a three factor pro
duction function with 
8. For instance, 
ex ante elasticity of substitutio
n a assumed constant and commo
n between 
might be the chosen
all pairs of factors. The parameter
 y, 0 ~ y ~ a 
would not enter
ex post elasticity of substitution. 
In this case, y 
would be chosen under most circu
mstances.
F( ) • If C(o) -= 0 , y -= a 
However, vith potential expropri
ation it may be optimal for the 
host if 
This outcome is preferred
firms choose y, a at cczt C(~)
 > 0. 
can be raised by the additional 
deterrent provided by the
because YN 
ex post inflexibility of technolo
gy. 
9. 1Jhen managers and capital are s
ubstitutes (FKH < 0), the possib
ility
- ~ K
H(e) > H(e) , the increase in
arises that in some states in whic
h 
Tesulting from the ilnposition of
 the penalty does not overcome t
he 
Because the penal~y
~egative effect of the penalty i
tself on income. 
Teduces host-country_income in th
ese states of nature, ve cannot 
rule 
out the possibility that expected
 host country income falls as a T
esult 
of a penalty. 
10. Tobin (1974) also considers the 
distributional consequences of a
n .!E,! 
Since he assumes a linear techno
logy and an arbitrary
of expropriation. 
number of factors, his results d
iffer somewhat. . ; J..: 
.. 
. ,_·· .. 
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